Naxal movement in Chhattisgarh

Answers given to an interview on the above subject conducted by Jostein Jakobsen, a research student from the University of Oslo, Norway. ++++++++++++++++++++++++ Q) Can you start by telling me something about your personal background and professional career? A) I belong to 1971 Batch of IAS. I have published a book containing a collection of poems "Travails and Thrills of Third World Nations" dealing with several subjects throwing light on personal background and professional career too. I shall send a copy soon. After reading it you may forward the copy to the Professor of English literature in the University. In 1960s and 1970s very talented youths from arts background used to join All India Services with most of them having personal and professional goals to serve the community. I was one of those officials with utmost devotion and dedication even at the cost of family interest and welfare. I was highly influenced by the life and teaching of Mahatma Gandhi, the father of indian nation. My hero and the role model in IAS was of course one Sir Thomas Monroe, a British officer who rose from the ranks in the army of East India Company, became the administrator in North Tamil Nadu, got appointed as the Governor of Madras Presidency and who devoted his life for the welfare of South Indians till his death at the cost of his family life. My background both in the family and profession was mostly similar to that of this hero. Q) What sort of experience have you had with the Naxalite insurgency through your work in the IAS? A) I happened to know and understand the activities of Naxalites for the first time in 1993-94 when I was the Managing Director of Madhya Pradesh State Mining Development Corporation and working from Bhopal, the state capital. We had bauxite mines in Keshkal area of Bastar (composite) district. Annoyed with the operation of mines the Naxalites burnt down our machineries and stopped the work while the assistant Manager, a local official in charge of those mines ran away from the camp and the district. I had a tough time in cajoling him and take him to the site with me for inspection. I saw for the first time the damage done by them and restored the work of mining by changing the officer and engaging in a dialogue with the Naxalites through other officials. Although I was keen to meet them, roam around for a while and discuss the matter in the forest area during 1993, my officers developed cold feet and refused to take me to their forest hideout till I left the post. Q) What accounts in your view for the growth of Naxalism in Bastar over the last 30 years? A) Despite the enormous sums of money spent every year for the welfare of tribals in Bastar region for more than three decades by the state government of Madhya Pradesh through its officials the economic condition of these tribals did not improve to the extent planned and promised. In fact the subordinate officials of revenue, forest and police departments at the local and interior places failed to work honestly and sympathetically towards these tribals. When naxalism was expanding beyond West Bengal after the land reforms and spreading to neighbouring states like Bihar, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh ( including the present Chhattisgarh) was not far off . Rather it provided a safe hideout in the sprawling forest of Bastar region for the Naxalites. Many people like me in government hierarchy were sure that Chhattisgarh would soon be a fertile ground for their activities which actually turned out to be true in the last decade. Under the dense forest cover the helpless and gullible tribal youths had no other option except to assist the Naxalites. Q) How to understand the way the former Madhya Pradesh government approached the Naxalites in Bastar? A) For Madhya Pradesh government the naxalism movement in a far off Bastar region was not a programme on priority at the initial stages. Q) In what ways did the conflict change after the establishment of Chhattisgarh state? A) After the formation of Chhattisgarh, the Naxalite activity increased many-fold and received more focus from Chhattisgarh Government mostly due to escalation in violence and terrorism unleashed by them from time to time. So much so that senior officials from the state government of Chhattisgarh stopped touring the interior pockets of Bastar Division after November, 2000. It so happened that I was in charge of mineral resources department as the Principal Secretary to Chhattisgarh Government from June, 2001. I was again keen to see a particular corundum mine near Bijapur town, the Headquarters of a newly-created district. That particular mine was almost vandalised by the Naxalites and the lease-holder of the mine was unable to start the mining operation. I visited the area much against the will of my subordinates and saw the mine being dug up haphazardly. Luckily or unluckily I didn't confront them although they were camping very close-by. That was the last visit of a Secretary-level officer from the Government of Chhattisgarh in 2002 to any naxal-infested territory without any police protection. Nobody dared a visit thereafter for the spot inspection of interior places by any senior official from Raipur. The same mine operated by the Madhya Pradesh State Mining Corporation was inspected by me in 1994 as the M.D of the Corporation eight years ago. Q) How to understand the Chhattisgarh government’s response to the Naxalite insurgency? A) A serious attempt was no doubt made by Raman Singh, the chief minister of B.J.P Government after 2004 but was not found fruitful due to half-hearted measures and unsystematic approach. Q) What has been the significance of different forms of administration, state structure etc. in comparing Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh approach to Maoists? Have you seen any differences between Congress rule and BJP rule in such regard? A) There were only sporadic clashes and no major direct confrontations with the state authorities before BJP government took over administration in Chhattisgarh. Congress rule didn't have a major confrontation with the Naxalites. It is only the BJP government that is more accountable for such an escalation of violence in the region. Q) What has been the role of the police in curbing Naxalism in Bastar? Here it would be interesting to know how the police force was operating, organised, etc during the 1990s and later. What tactics and strategies did the police establish in order to combat Naxalites? A) The police has been on the defensive mostly so far. They themselves are an easy pray/ target for the Naxalites. The land-mines planted all over become an obstacle for the police to move freely in the forest. Naxalites are running a parallel government in Bastar area. The paramilitary force is not a big and all-powerful enemy for the Naxalites. They easily indulge in attacks on them as and when they find it convenient to do so. Gradually they are proving to be a superior force in the field. The tactics and strategies adopted by the police have not been very fruitful so far. Even the posting for an year of one Mr.K.P.S .Gill the former DGP of Punjab State Police, who earlier controlled terrorism there, to manage the affairs in Bastar failed to make an impact. Q) In Andhra Pradesh the police established efficient forms of intelligence gathering, informer networks etc – have such things happened in Chhattisgarh as well? A) Tried but not as successful as it was in Andhra Pradesh. Probably Bastar is too big and a compact area in forest for the police to manage and control. C.G police is no match to A.P force in regard to intelligence gathering. Q) What has been the role, then, of central paramilitaries here? When did they first become deployed in Bastar? Cooperation with local police, etc. A) Central Government has been very helpful in several ways. They had deployed maximum force for assisting C.G Police since 2008. They had released enough funds for acquisition of modern weapons and provision of advanced training in combat operations But the local police failed to utilise the force to its advantage. Proper coordination is also lacking. Q) Have you observed differences of opinion within the state with regard to how to approach the Maoists? A) Yes there is a difference of opinion among the political groups over the government approach to tackle the issue. Q) How have state policies of tribal development contributed to the topic at hand? A) already covered above. Q) How did Naxalites establish themselves in Bastar from the early 1980s and onward? A) They increased their strength year after year and established their Hdqrs in Bastar in due course. Since 1980 as many as 12000 civilians and about 3000 paramilitary and police personnel have been targeted and killed by Naxalites. During the same period about 5000 Naxalites too have lost their lives in the hands of police and other uniformed forces. The year 2010 has been very devastating because about 720 people have been killed that year alone in states such as M.P, A.P, C.G, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha U.P and West Bengal. Q) What issues and problems did Naxalites involve themselves in to gain support among tribals? A) General exploitation by the official machinery is the common issue projected by the Naxalites to gain sympathy and support of the tribals. After a while the Naxalites turned out to be the inevitable god fathers whom the tribals can't afford to antagonise. An informer is always identified and tortured so much that nobody gains courage to expose them to the police. Q) I have read that Naxalites attempted some forms of mass mobilization through various front organizations during the 80s and 90s. What do you know about this? What was the response of the government to these organizations? A) Mass mobilisation gained currency as time passed by with more educated youth joining the movement and the local youths willingly joining them over a period of time. I am not familiar with the name and history of front organisations operating in the area at the moment. Q) What aspects of adivasi society and development in Bastar must be taken into account to understand how it became possible for Naxalites to establish themselves in that area? A) already covered above. Q) Have you observed changes to the support or lack of support among tribals over time? Also: would some tribal groups have been more supportive of Naxalites than others? Or some segments of tribal society? A) Gradually a major section of tribal youths has joined Naxalite movement due to consistent persuasion and brain-washing. It is very difficult to totally wean them away from their influence and clutches in the short run. Q) Do you know how Naxalites have been organized in Chhattisgarh and how such organization has changed over time? I am thinking of their hierarchies, party structure, squads etc. A) As already pointed out above they are running a parallel government with departments like finance & budget, security, intelligence, media wing etc. They have a highly-structured hierarchy with territories allotted to their rank and file with annual targets. Q) Do you know whether their organization in the state changed as the People’s War joined with MCC to become CPI (Maoist)? A) Yes it appears so. Q) And also: what about the in the state and changes over time? A) Already answered. Naxalite leadership has grown in style and strength and their role and responsibility have been defined and distributed for implementation. They however try to dictate and make the local population behave in a particular fashion on several occasions. Q) What sort of violent activities have Naxalites carried out in Bastar since the early 1990s? A) They terrorise the public from time to time to maintain their supremacy in that area. They attack the paramilitary force as and when they find them in a vulnerable position by laying land mines on their route and explode their vehicles killing in large numbers. The latest killing of Mahendra Karma, the Congress leader who was instrumental in establishing Salwa Judum and putting tribal families in camps for their survival and also the shooting of Nand Kumar Patel, the state-level President of Congress party, his son and another veteran Congress leader VidyaCharan Shukla was with a purpose. Q) Do you have any comments about the role of natural resources in this conflict in Chhattisgarh? For example, here comes the question of the significance of mining. A) Mining displaces tribals in a big way. No rehabilitation programme is successfully and satisfactorily implemented with the result the tribals have no option except to side with the Naxalites. In a way the Naxalites do extract protection money from mining contractors too without fail. Q) How would you comment on the controversial Salwa Judum and Special Police Officers? A) This experiment has failed to change the situation. In fact the Supreme Court of India has declared it unconstitutional and ordered for its abolition. Under the name of Salwa Judum some persons - both officials and non-officials have pocked large sums of money. Q) What do you think about alleged relations between Naxalites and political parties in Bastar? A) May be the Communist Party of India (Marxist) has sympathy and connection with Naxalites and other parties or their workers keep the Naxalites in good humour for protecting their own life and property. Q) Can you tell me about the role of land to the Naxalite movement in Bastar? Land ownership, landlords, etc. Here is a related question the role of forests. A) Land and water resources are the precious assets of tribals and when they are disturbed in the name of development they take the help of Naxalites as far as possible. But the tribals are losing their grip over their lands despite severe and sufficient protection provided in the Constitution of India and the state laws. Q) Do you have any insights regarding how Naxalites have been able to finance their operations in Bastar? A) Already answered above. +++++++++ My solution to the Problem: "The Bastar region should be brought under the Central Rule under the leadership of an Administrator/ Lt. governor with a strong paramilitary force to drive away the Naxalites once for all. This point of total combing operation for once by all the government servants at least for one full month to surround them and make them surrender, if necessary with a military force for a while was sincerely suggested by me in a meeting of ministers and secretaries held in the state secretariat in 2005 in the presence of Raman Singh, Mahendra Karma and other political leaders too". +++++++++++++++++++++++